# Neg- Cambridge Guns Aff- TOC – Nirmal

## Strat

#### Guns Not CPS T

#### Util NC

#### PIC

#### Straight Turns- need to respond to standpoint epistemology args in the aff

# 1NC

## T

#### Interpretation- Gun carrying on campus is intimidation and isn’t constitutionally protected free speech- the aff must only defend the removal of restrictions of constitutionally protected free speech

#### Gun regulation is constitutionally protected but open gun carry is not a form of speech

**Bailey 16** [By Cierra Bailey, "Sorry Gun Nuts, Gun Control Is Not The Same As Censoring Free Speech," Carbonated.TV, <http://www.carbonated.tv/news/sorry-gun-nuts-gun-control-is-not-the-same-as-censoring-free-speech>. 2016] NB

Why do gun advocates always take the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution and compare it to the first amendment as a way to refute [gun control](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/politicians-cant-hide-behind-lame-gun-control-excuses-anymore)? Recently, [presidential candidate Rand Paul](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/rand-paul-mansplains-to-a-reporter-how-to-conduct-an-interview) was featured on an episode of the daytime talk show, The View and he — as many other gun nuts have before — said that regulating the use and sale of firearms is the same as censoring free speech. Recommended: [There Will Be No Free Speech When Ben Carson's In Charge](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/ben-carson-dept-of-education-censor-speech-on-college-campuses) One would have to assume that people use the first amendment in these far-fetched comparisons because it’s a right that the general public is most familiar with and exercise regularly. That reasoning, however, still doesn’t excuse the fact that there is no real comparison between the two, unless you try to argue that [all of the mass shootings that occurred in 2015](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/senator-reviews-2015-by-listing-mass-shootings-one-tweet-at-a-time) were carried out using word of mouth, pens and keyboards. All jokes aside, a key differentiating factor gun advocates tend to ignore is that free speech is actually REGULATED. You can’t legally use free speech to incite panic, you can’t make false statements without consequences, you can’t legally go around slandering and/or threatening people and there are strict prohibitions related to obscenity. Free speech restrictions are fairly strict and clear, but gun laws are not. Due to this leniency, guns are getting into the hands of the wrong people resulting in countless untimely and devastating deaths. For argument's sake, let's take a look at driving laws which are more realistic to compare with gun restrictions. Although driving a car is a privilege and not a right, the law acknowledges that a person could damage personal property, kill or injure someone while behind the wheel of a car. Therefore, you're required to learn the rules of the road, take a test, have valid insurance and keep your vehicle registered in order to legally operate a car. Bearing arms may be a constitutional right, but guns have the same risks associated with them as cars do and yet there are loopholes galore among the current gun laws. Read More: [The NRS Just Tweeted A Threat To These Pro-Gun Control Politicians](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/the-nra-just-tweeted-a-threat-to-these-progun-control-politicians) Also important to note, while driving a car and shooting a gun clearly have similar risks associated with each of them, exercising free speech does not. Speech can cause harm, of course, but not nearly to the same degree as firearms. [President Barack Obama](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/obama-on-gun-control-we-need-more-background-checks) recently had enough of all the back and forth about gun control and took executive action with improved safety laws and comprehensive background checks which has right-wingers up in arms [claiming Obama wants to infringe upon citizens' rights and take their guns away.](http://www.carbonated.tv/news/fearmongering-ted-cruzs-campaign-revolts-obama-wants-your-guns) This pro-gun logic is what Paul was defending on The View when he made the terrible comparison that bamboozles Americans into thinking that guns and free speech are comparable.

#### Gun carrying on campus is intimidation and isn’t protected

**Lithwick and Turner 13** [Dahlia Lithwick and Christian Turner, 11-12-2013, "A Gun? Or Free Speech? The Strange and Alarming Rise of “Open Carry” Demonstrations.," Slate Magazine, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/open_carry_demonstrations_is_carrying_a_gun_to_a_protest_protected_by_the.html> NB

This is why even [supporters of the armed protestors and their First and Second Amendment rights concede](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/363670/moms-demand-action-open-carry-texas-and-mysterious-photographer-charles-c-w-cooke" \t "_blank) that this means of counter-protest is a mistake: “I don’t know at what point the open carrying of rifles at a counter-protest becomes ‘intimidation,’” writes Charles C. W. Cooke at the National Review Online, “but I do know that getting close to that line is not a sensible or civil thing to do and that it is unlikely to win one any friends.” Burning crosses are undeniably intimidating symbols of abhorrent ideas. Guns are not even always symbolic. Whatever else may be said with them, guns always say, “I can kill.” And the audience always hears, “That gun can kill me with the slightest of its carrier’s effort. My life hangs entirely upon the carrier’s forbearance.” We can find that message frightening and repulsive without considering it political speech. It’s scary to place your life, and the lives of your children, in the hands of a multitude of strangers each with the power effortlessly to take it. The protestors tell us they want to talk about freedom, but we will inevitably hear the undeniable threat built into the barrel of the gun itself. Our law should say we don’t have to.

#### Violation- the aff

#### Standards

#### 1. Limits- the aff defends removing restrictions on gun control on campus which gives them access to a large amount of advantages that aren’t intrinsic to the resolution, that guts effective 1nc prep that is relevant to the aff because we lose out on any normal DAs to speech because the aff uses their extraT advantages to weigh out of them. That also means that it’s impossible to prep against their aff specific and requires an incredible amount of case neg work which guts effective research- even if we do have turns, the aff is massively overprepped on them because they know their aff. Ground key to fairness because it ensures args operate on the same level

#### 2. Topic Education- we only have two months to discuss the legitimacy of free speech on college campuses but the aff entirely moots that discussion which kills effective discussion over the main issue. Topic Ed outweighs – we only debate the topic for 3 months

#### Voter

#### 1. Fairness, debates a competitive activity, 2. Education, only portable impact. Drop the debater because A. Norms- a loss deters future abuse, B. Timeskew- drop the arg means they can kick their offense for a positive time tradeoff. C. Gateway issue- unfair args skew the rest of the round. Evaluate Competing Interps, A. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention, B. deterrence- debaters can get away with defense on theory, C. reasonability collapses into competing itnersp because we have offense defense debates about brightlines, D. it’s a binary- either the aff is topical or it’s not 5. No RVI: A. Chills theory- RVIs deter me from reading theory because good theory debaters will bait abuse and go for the RVI which causes infinite abuse. B. Kills substance- they will just collapse to the shell which ruins the possibility of us ever returning to having education. C. Illogical- you shouldn’t win for being fair. Logic is an impact because it’s the basis of argumentation. D. No abuse- you could read your own shell or prove that I violate and you don’t which equals the theory layer

## NC

### Framework

#### The value is morality

#### Moral realism is true- pain and pleasure are only intrinsic values

**Gray 09** [Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. <https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/>. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)]

**If we have evidence** that **anything** in particular **has intrinsic value**, then we also have evidence that **moral realism is true**. Our experiences of pleasure and pain are probably the most powerful evidence of intrinsic value because such experiences are tied to our belief that they have intrinsic value. My argument that pain has intrinsic disvalue is basically the following: We experience that pain is bad. We experience that pain is important. The disvalue of pain is irreducible. The disvalue of pain is real. If pain is bad in the sense of being important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. Therefore, pain has intrinsic disvalue. I am not certain that the premises are true, but I currently find good reasons for accepting them. Therefore, we have reason for accepting the conclusion. The conclusion could be read saying, “We have reason to believe that pain has intrinsic disvalue.” If we accept that **pain has intrinsic disvalue**, then we will simultaneously accept moral realism.1 In order to examine the plausibility of my argument, I will examine each of the premises: We experience that pain is bad. We know pain is bad **because of our experience** of it. If someone described their pain as extremely wonderful, we would doubt they are feeling pain. Either the person is lying or doesn’t know what the word “pain” means. When a child decides not to touch fire because it causes pain, we understand the justification. **It would be strange to ask** the child, “So what? **What’s wrong with pain**?” We experience that pain is important. If pain is important in the relevant sense, then it can provide us reason to do something without merely helping us fulfill our desires. In other words, we must accept the following: The badness of pain isn’t just an instrumental value. The badness of **pain is a final end**. Pain’s badness isn’t an instrumental value – Pain’s disvalue is not an instrumental disvalue because pain can be quite useful to us. **Pain** can tell us when we are unhealthy or injured. We evolved pain because **i**t’**s** **essential** **to** our **survival**. Pain’s bad for a different kind of reason. Pain’s disvalue is found in our negative experience, and this is why pain is a candidate for having an intrinsic disvalue. Whenever someone claims that something has intrinsic value, we need to make sure that it’s not just good because it’s instrumentally valuable. If it’s merely useful at bringing about something else, then it’s not good in and of itself (as intrinsic values are). Pain is perhaps the perfect example of something that is useful but bad. If usefulness was the only kind of value, then pain would actually be good because it helps us in many ways. Pain’s badness isn’t just our dislike of pain – We dislike **pain** because it **feels bad**.2 If pain didn’t feel bad, then we wouldn’t have such a strong desire to avoid intense pain. Pain means “feels bad” and it **is manifested in various experiences**, such as touching fire. **We have to know the meaning of “bad”** in order to understand pain at all. **We attain an understanding of “bad” just by feeling pain**. If pain was only bad because we dislike it, then we couldn’t say that “pain really matters.” Instead, the badness of pain would just be a matter of taste. However, we don’t just say pain is bad because we dislike it. We also say pain is bad because of how it feels. Avoiding **pain is a final end** – A final end is a goal people recognize as being **worthy of being sought after for its own sake**. Money is not a final end **because** it is only valuable when used to do something else. Pleasure and pain-avoidance are final ends because they are taken t be worthy of being avoided for their own sake. We know that avoiding pain makes sense even when **it doesn’t lead to anything else** of value, so avoiding pain is a final end.3 If I want to take an aspirin, someone could ask, “Why did you do that?” I could answer, “I have a headache.” This should be the end of the story. We understand that avoiding pain makes sense. It would be absurd for someone to continue to question me and say, “What difference does having a headache make? That’s not a good reason to take an aspirin!”4 Both realists and anti-realists can agree that pain is bad, and they can both agree that pain is a final end. Our desire to avoid pain is non-instrumental and such a desire is experienced as justified. (However, the ant-realist might argue that it is only taken to be justified because of human psychology.) If pain is a final end, then we understand (a) that pain is important and (b) it makes sense to say that we ought to avoid pain. **Pain’s disvalue is irreducible**. **If the badness of pain was reducible to nonmoral properties, then we should be able to describe what** “bad” means **through a non-moral description**. **However**, **we** currently **have no** way of understanding pain’s badness as being something else. We can’t describe pain’s badness in non-moral terms. If someone needs to know what ” bad” means, they need to experience something bad. To say that some moral states are irreducible is just like saying that some mental states are irreducible. Pain itself can’t be described through a non-mental description. If we told people the mental states involved with pain, they would still not know what pain is because they need to know what it feels like. Someone could argue that **“bad” means the same thing as** something like **“pain,”** and then we would find out that the badness of pain could be reduced to something else. However, pain and the badness of pain are conceptually separable. For example, I could find out that something else is bad other than pain. They could then reply that “bad” means the same thing as a disjunction of various other bad things, such as “pain or malicious intent.” But people who disagree about what constitutes what is “bad” aren’t just arguing about the meaning of the word “bad.” They are arguing about what has the property “bad.”5 Additionally, the word “bad” would no longer have any importance. If “bad” just means “pain or malicious intent,” then why care about it? Why ought I refrain from causing pain or having a malicious intent? It could be that we can find out that “bad” and “pain” are identical, but then “bad” might not be entirely reducible to “pain” (or a disjunction of bad things). We might still think that there are two legitimate descriptions at work. The “pain” description and the “bad” description. (Some people think water is H2O through an identity relation similar to this.) This sort of irreducible identity relation require us to deny that pain is “important.” (If the identity theory did require us to deny that pain is “important,” then we would have a good reason to reject such an identity theory.) I have given reason to think the word “bad” is irreducible, but I haven’t proven it. If someone could prove that pain isn’t important, and we can reduce pain to something else, then I will be proven wrong. I just don’t see any reason to agree with that position at this time. I discuss the badness of pain as irreducible in more detail in my essays “Objection to Moral Realism Part 1: Is/Ought Gap” and “Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness.” The badness of pain is real. **If the badness of pain is real**, **then everyone’s pain is bad**. Pain isn’t bad just for me, but not for you. It states that **we don’t** all merely **share a subjective preference** in avoiding pain, **but** that pain’s badness is something worthy of being avoided and helping others avoid it. Why does it seem reasonable to believe pain’s badness to be real? There are at least four reasons. One, I experience that **my pain hurts and I know that other people do as well**. Two, it’s not just people’s subjective preferences in question. People hate pain because of how it feels. Three, people’s pain exists (and if pain exists, then the badness of the pain exists). Four, I see no reason to deny that the badness of other people’s pain exists. I will discuss this final consideration in more detail when I discuss anti-realist objections. We have no good reason to deny that pain is bad. We experience that pain is bad for ourselves, and other people experience that pain is bad for themselves as well. **Even though pain is subjective,** there is nothing delusional about our belief that pain is bad. **It’s not just a** personal **like or a dislike**. We don’t just agree to treat other people’s pain as important as part of a social contract. The belief that the badness of pain is real and “pain is bad no matter who experiences it” will be rejected by anti-realists. If I gave food to the hungry, it would be absurd to question why I did it. Imagine someone who disagrees with my action and says, “Other people’s pain is irrelevant. You should only try to avoid pain for yourself, so feeding the hungry is stupid.” This person’s position is counterintuitive to the point of absurdity. We have all accepted that other people’s pain matters. It makes sense to feed the hungry, it makes sense to give to charity, and it makes sense to give someone an aspirin who has a headache. We don’t have to benefit from helping other people. To deny that “pain is bad no matter who experiences it” isn’t a position that many people can find acceptable. (I suppose some sociopaths might find it acceptable.) If pain is bad, important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. I want to suggest this premise to be justified in virtue of the very meaning of intrinsic value. If pain is bad, important (worthy of being desired), irreducible, and real; then I think we have already established that pain has intrinsic disvalue by definition. We have established **moral facts** that could **give us what we ought to do**, such as, “We ought to avoid pain.” Such an ought judgment is not merely based on my personal belief or desire; it’s based on the fact that pain is important no matter who experiences it. Conclusion: Pain has intrinsic disvalue If my premises are true, then the conclusion follows. I have given reason for accepting the premises, so we have some reason for accepting the conclusion, and the conclusion entails the truth of moral realism. I will take all of my premises to be sufficiently justified, but I will consider why someone might decide that the badness of pain “isn’t real.” An anti-realist could attempt to deny that “pain is bad no matter who experiences it.” The strongest evidence that badness is real is the fact that denying it seems to require unjustified philosophical commitments. I will attempt to show that the alternatives are less justified in the next section.

#### Outweighs:

#### A. Maximization- All pleasure is intrinsically valuable for the same experiential reason-- side constraints deny intrinsic value and that outweighs because it's a question of logical consistency

#### B. Agency- Constitutive obligations are contingent unless they are inescapable- only pain and pleasure define humanity

#### Moral uncertainty means we prevent extinction

**Bostrom 11** --¶ (2011) Nick Bostrom, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not [or] even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving**—**and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe

#### Reductionism, Temporal states change desires and make personal identity non continuous because we can’t experience the future – turns will based frameworks and creates a state of rational dependence for posterity

**Olson 10** [Eric T. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield) “Personal Identity” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Oct 28, 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#PsyApp>]

Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. **If your cerebrum**—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—**were transplanted, the recipient would be** psychologically continuous with **you** by anyone's lights (even if there would also be important psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you. If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What **if we** did both at once, **destroy**ing **one hemisphere and transplant**ing **the other**? Then too, **the one who got the transplant**ed hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach **would be you.** But now **suppose** that **both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head.** (We needn't pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) **The two recipients**—call them Lefty and Righty—**will each be** psychologically continuous with **you.** The Psychological Approach as I have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. **But that cannot be**: Lefty and Righty are two, and **one thing cannot be** numerically identical with **two things.** Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn't. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren't. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: **a contradiction.**

#### This means consequentialism- moral theories can’t focus on individuals since there’s nothing that unifies them across time- only states of affairs have values

#### Frameworks must be theoretically legitimate- any standard is an interpretation of the word ought-

#### A. Ground- every impact functions under util whereas other ethics flow to one side exclusively, kills fairness since we both need arguments to win.

#### B. Topic lit- most articles are written through the lens of util because they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Key to fairness and education- the lit is where we do research and determines how we engage in the round.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing foreseen expected wellbeing

### <Insert Any DA/PIC w/ !!!>

## Case

### Standpoint Epis

#### Standpoint epistemology is self-undermining and gives no standards of epistemic comparison

**Rolin 6**

Kristina Rolin (University of Helsinki). “The Bias Paradox in Standpoint Epistemology.” Episteme, Vol. 3, Issue 2. 2006. Project MUSE.

The thesis of epistemic privilege has been criticized on two grounds. One objection is that Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology does not provide any standards of epistemic justification that enable one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as better than others. Another objection is that there is no evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. These two objections are connected. As long as it is not clear what standards of epistemic justifi cation allow one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as better than others, it is not clear either what kind of evidence we should expect in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. Let me explain each objection. Th e fi rst objection is raised by Louise Antony (1993) and Helen Longino (1999). Th ey argue that the thesis of epistemic privilege is undermined by another thesis in Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology, the thesis that all scientific knowledge is socially situated (Harding 1991, 11; see also pages 119 and 142). I call this the situated knowledge thesis (see also Wylie 2003, 31). The thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that there is a standard of impartiality that enables one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as “less partial and distorted” than others. The situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge claims are partial in virtue of being grounded on a particular perspective on social reality. As Helen Longino explains, in order to argue that some socially grounded perspectives are better than others, a standpoint epistemologist would have to be able to identify privileged perspectives from a non-interested position, but according to standpoint epistemology, there is no such position (1999, 338; see also Hekman 2000, 24). Louise Antony calls the tension between the thesis of epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis a “bias paradox” (1993, 188-189). In claiming that all knowledge is partial, feminist standpoint epistemology challenges the very notion of impartiality. But by undermining the notion of impartiality, feminist standpoint epistemology is in danger of losing its critical edge (Antony 1993, 189).

#### Standpoint epistemology lacks rigorous empirical backing

**Rolin 6**

Kristina Rolin (University of Helsinki). “The Bias Paradox in Standpoint Epistemology.” Episteme, Vol. 3, Issue 2. 2006. Project MUSE.

Let me turn to the second objection, the claim that there is no evidence to support the thesis of epistemic privilege. Th is objection is raised by Cassandra Pinnick (1994 and 2005). Pinnick suggests that the thesis of epistemic privilege should be understood as an empirical hypothesis and she claims that feminist literature “describes no eff ort to accumulate the kind of empirical data that could easily resolve matters in favor of the feminists” (Pinnick 1994, 653; see also Hekman 2000, 23). Ten years aft er the publication of her critical paper in Philosophy of Science, Pinnick (2005) claims that the thesis of epistemic privilege still remains without evidence to support it. EPISTEME 2006 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology 127 It is not fair to claim that there is no eff ort to argue for the thesis of epistemic privilege in Harding’s Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Harding presents seven claims in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege: (1) Women’s lives have been devalued and neglected as starting points for scientifi c research and as the generators of evidence for or against knowledge claims (Harding 1991, 121). (2) Women are “strangers” to the social order (Harding 1991, 124). (3) Women’s oppression gives them fewer interests in ignorance about the social order (Harding 1991, 125). (4) Women can come to understand hidden aspects of social relations between the genders and the institutions that support these relations by means of struggles to change them (Harding 1991, 127). (5) Women’s perspective is from everyday life (Harding 1991, 128). (6) Women’s perspective comes from mediating ideological dualisms: nature versus culture (Harding 1991, 130). (7) Women researchers are “outsiders within” (Harding 1991, 131). However, Harding’s arguments fail to be convincing for two reasons. One reason is that the universal extension of her claims about women undermines their plausibility. Certainly, we can think of counter-examples to each claim, for example, women whose lives have not been devalued, women who are not strangers to the social order, or women who have an interest in ignorance about social order, and so on. But even if the extension of Harding’s claims about women is narrowed down, her arguments fail to be convincing for another reason. The reason is that it is not clear how these seven claims support the thesis of epistemic privilege, the claim that women’s social positions, insofar as they are unprivileged, are likely to generate better perspectives on social reality than other social positions. More specifically, it is not clear what is meant by a perspective in feminist standpoint epistemology. As long as it is not clear what a socially grounded perspective is and what the relevant alternatives are, the thesis of epistemic privilege lacks empirical content.

#### The burden of the negative is to disprove the resolution through an objective lens that uses statistics and factual stories rather than isolated narratives

#### There are certain facts that are accessible to all individuals like util because it’s based on empirical nature . It also is the best solution to their Mills evidence because it priveleges only what individuals feel and know rather than certain narratives

#### Habermas is wrong—yes perspectives of those affected matter, but objective data that relies on those perspectives is just as comparative, and the aff is the one that excludes interests which makes it harder to achieve moral truth absent actually considering everyone’s ideas

#### Their framework isn’t normative—it can never convince others that logically their position is best, rather it claims exclusive knowledge over a single area which is arbitrary and non-verifiable through a majoritarian view

#### We don’t link into Butler- we don’t exclude perspectives, and their framework commits the is-ought fallacy just because ethics or discussion usually priveleges certain voices doesn’t mean that it will automatically and the NC claims that everyone’s pain is bad

#### The NC framework isn’t abstraction- that avoids Yancy’s criticism, rather it prioritizes empirical realities that affect all bodies- that also proves that we don’t fail to tell stories of the oppressed, rather we attempt to prioritize all views and understand their truth claims

#### Their Abrams card describes how legal argumentation usually operates- not how it should operate—they prescribe the wrong solution to the problem, just because white philosophy cherrypicks their types of rationality is not a reason to get rid of logical deduction but rather should change the way we accept narratives rather than arbitrary privileging

### Turns

#### The presence of handguns on campus chills discussion and should be banned

**TEB 17**: Times Editorial Board, January 17th, 2017. “Allowing concealed weapons on college campuses is a silly, and dangerous, idea”. Los Angeles Times. <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-colleges-concealed-weapons-nra-20170110-story.html>

“Be careful discussing sensitive topics.” “Drop certain topics from your curriculum.” “[Don’t] ‘go there’ if you sense anger.” A faculty working group at the University of Houston recently [offered](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/24/u-houston-faculty-senate-suggests-changes-teaching-under-campus-carry) these recommendations to professors preparing for Texas’s new campus-carry law, set to take effect August 1. The situation to which these recommendations are alluding—gun violence in response to controversial or otherwise difficult classroom discussions—is at this point only a hypothetical worst-case scenario. But critics of the legislation are still appalled: To abide by the law, and keep everyone safe in classrooms with armed students, faculty may ultimately have to resort to self-censorship. Proponents of the legislation, which allows individuals with concealed-carry permits to possess firearms on public-university campuses, argue that fears surrounding campus carry are overblown. In the eight states that have already enacted such a law, none of the predicted nightmares have taken place—students drawing their weapons on professors who fail them, for example, or students firing on one another in heated classroom arguments. In fact, campus-carry supporters maintain that the law will keep the peace, enabling students and faculty to defend themselves effectively, and deter would-be shooters. So long as universities are gun-free zones, gun-rights advocates argue, they are well-advertised targets for prospective attackers. But the potential benefits of the law are slight, and dubious at best. It turns out, for example, there were armed students at Umpqua Community College in Oregon on the day of its shooting last fall. Their presence did not deter the attack, nor did they halt it; the students wisely decided not to jump into the fray for fear it would compound the mayhem. By contrast, campus carry’s potential for harm is quite real. Its principal threat is less than obvious, however; its impact may not be physically manifest at all. I’m counting its cost in terms of what is lost in the classroom—and it is a loss that may be deeply damaging to the country’s democracy. This can be gleaned from the faculty concerns at the University of Houston. In short, they argued that guns in the classroom pose an intolerable threat to free speech. It’s unclear whether campus carry does and will in fact undermine the freedom of expression, but if there’s one place in society where the citizenry must not tolerate such threats, it’s the college classroom. The college classroom is meant to be a special space where all manner of ideas are aired, considered, and debated, and differences negotiated—through speech and argument—with no fear of violent recrimination, no fear of inciting angry students to draw their guns. In my philosophy and politics classes, for example, I—like peers in my field—routinely broach contentious issues: topics such as structural racism, abortion, and gun rights (the most contentious of them all). Few young adults have put significant thought into these kinds of issues; they must experiment with them to understand them properly and deeply, and to develop mature and critical views. It’s important to ensure that students feel free to explore their thoughts and express them—frankly—so they can experiment and develop. They must feel free to push their intellectual limits, and entertain lines of argument that are controversial, probably offensive to some. It is a goal, an often elusive ideal, that the college classroom be that space where the circulation and contest of ideas are freewheeling and dynamic, as ideas are subjected to the close inspection of logic, and measured in the light of history and personal experience. This can—and many will say should—be a raucous affair on occasion. It seems that campus carry stands opposed to these pedagogical goals. Will guns encourage speech and invite people to discussion and debate in the classroom? The reality could be quite to the contrary: Guns could have a chastening effect. If students suspect that neighbors in the classroom may be armed, this may make them less inclined to engage them in frank and open discussion, on potentially uncomfortable or challenging topics. Guns speak; they send a message, which, gun owners and gun rights advocates readily admit, is something like this: Don’t mess with me—be careful—I am armed; I know how to use my weapon, and am prepared to do so if need be. Thanks to Stand Your Ground, they may draw their weapons on merely perceived threats. Stand Your Ground laws protect citizens from prosecution in cases where they feel threatened in public, and fire their weapons. Predictably, the legislation has spawned numerous controversies, and several tragedies, across the country. Gun owners have shot and killed unarmed citizens—and sought Stand Your Ground protections—in cases in which they misjudged or overestimated the threats before them. Or the law emboldened them to wield their weapons when they were just plain angry. In 2014, a Montana man [invoked](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/markus-kaarma-montana-man-convicted-in-german-exchange-students-death/) Stand Your Ground after he shot and killed an unarmed German exchange student trespassing in his garage. That same year, Cyle Quadlin [killed](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2561755/Man-25-shot-killed-unarmed-stranger-fight-suburban-Walmart-booked-police-claim-self-defense.html) an unarmed man with whom he argued in an Arizona Walmart; he drew his weapon when he felt he was losing the fight, and police accepted his plea of self-defense. These are just two of many similar controversies stemming from the law What does Stand Your Ground tell students soon to enter armed classrooms? It may tell them to be wary around those who are armed, or possibly armed, for fear of seeming threatening. Of course, no one knows precisely what is threatening to whom, which could mean the message is more open-ended, and potentially devastating: Curtail your behavior in general—rein it in; watch what you say, to whom, and how. In fact, it may even send the message that it’s best to approach and engage others as little as possible. One University of Houston professor, Maria Gonzalez, [expressed](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/24/u-houston-faculty-senate-suggests-changes-teaching-under-campus-carry) her concerns over campus carry in the context of her own classes, which cover Marxist and Queer Theory. In so doing, she invoked the added mission universities have to provide safe harbor for ideas that may be unpopular in society at large, ideas that are radical to some. This is a key reason why universities offer tenure to faculty: to protect academic freedom and defend against censorship. Expansions of civil rights are almost always deeply unpopular at first; this was the case in the fight for women’s rights, suffrage for African Americans, and marriage equality for gays and lesbians. Universities play a key role in early discussions about expanding these rights: Radical ideas must be given a hearing, and require a space to be vetted and honed before emerging into the culture at large, and ultimately the political stage. I fear that campus carry will make students and faculty less inclined to engage in the critical intellectual work that must take place in the classroom, the courageous inquiry and experimentation American democracy requires. As Gonzalez suggests, classes devoted to highly controversial topics could be the most vulnerable in this respect. How many students are going to risk uncomfortable and potentially intrusive lines of inquiry about gender identity, for example, in conservative Texas—when some of their conservative peers may well be armed? Why even go there, if you are an instructor, and can’t hope to have a productive or illuminating conversation? It’s impossible to measure the cost of campus carry. But I wager that the cost will be evidenced in the mounting silence on college campuses, and the trepidation, timidity, and lack of creativity among new generations of voters. American democracy will be the poorer for it

#### Studies conclusively side neg- guns increase the risk of homicide on campus

**PHW 14** [Posted By Publichealthwatch, 3-10-2014, "Point Blank: Guns Don’t Belong On College Campuses – Here’s Why," publichealthwatch, <https://publichealthwatch.wordpress.com/2014/03/10/point-blank-guns-dont-belong-on-college-campuses-heres-why/>] NB

The overwhelming majority of the [4,314 colleges and universities](http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d07/ch_3.asp) in the United States prohibit students and faculty from carrying concealed handguns on campus (the exceptions include public colleges and universities in Utah; Blue Ridge Community College in Weyers Cave, Virginia; and Colorado State University in Fort Collins, Colorado). Despite high-profile shootings like the ones mentioned above, homicides at American colleges and universities remain rare events. A 2001 [study](http://clerycenter.org/) by the U.S. Department of Education found that the overall homicide rate at postsecondary education institutions was 0.07 per 100,000 of enrollment in 1999. By comparison, the criminal homicide rate in the United States was 5.7 per 100,000 persons overall in 1999, and 14.1 per 100,000 for persons ages 17 to 29. Another [study](http://www.bjs.gov/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf), conducted by the Department of Justice, found that 93% of violent crimes that victimize college students occur off campus. This research demonstrates conclusively that students on the campuses of postsecondary institutions are significantly safer than both their off-campus counterparts and the nation as a whole. The discrepancy in violent crime rates was largely attributed to the fact that nearly every academic institution has adopted strict policies to keep firearms away from the classroom and other campus environments. Our colleges and universities are safe sanctuaries for learning, and they would be endangered by the presence of concealed handguns for the following reasons: 1) Concealed handguns would detract from a healthy learning environment; 2) More guns on campus would create additional risk for students; 3) Shooters would not be deterred by concealed carry permit holders; 4) Concealed carry permit holders are not always “law-abiding” citizens; 5) Concealed carry permit holders are not required to have law enforcement training; and 6) Firearms are immensely more likely to be used to intimidate, threaten, or harm another person than to be used in self-defense.

#### Guns are racialized – homicides occur most often to Black people – this furthers militarism.

**Sager 13** [Sager, Josh. [B.A., Political Science, Boston University] “White Privilege and the 2nd Amendment.” *The Progressive Cynic*, 2013.]

This pro-white bias in regard to gun-ownership is both unfair and highly ironic. It is unfair because, if people claim that gun ownership is a constitutional right, then it would stand to reason that race and dress should be irrelevant to the exercise of that right[,] and. It is ironic, simply because a vast majority of random mass-shooters are young, isolated, white men and a vast majority of white victims are killed by white killers (86% in fact). **Racial biases in** the perception of **gun ownership** are not just an abstract societal phenomenon, as they can **have** very extreme **real-life consequences**. Studies have shown that **Americans who see people as armed threats are more likely to shoot** at th**em if they are not white, and are much faster to make fatal decisions. This** perception of armed minorities as threats can **lead to** their d**eaths at the hands of** paranoid **white people who**, ironically enough, often **support gun ownership**. Unfortunately, **this** type of **bias extends to police officers** when they are performing their duties (ex. the **killing of Amadou Diallo**[.]by the NYPD). In much the same way that African Americans have been stopped for driving while black,” **racial minorities have a much harder time ‘exercising their 2nd Amendment rights’ than white people—they are more likely to be stopped, or even killed during the stop.**

#### Guns are risky with the amount of people who drink, do drugs, have mental health concerns, and accidental shootings

**PHW 14** [Posted By Publichealthwatch, 3-10-2014, "Point Blank: Guns Don’t Belong On College Campuses – Here’s Why," publichealthwatch, <https://publichealthwatch.wordpress.com/2014/03/10/point-blank-guns-dont-belong-on-college-campuses-heres-why/>] NB

Allowing concealed carry permit holders to bring handguns onto college campuses would raise a host of public safety concerns for institutions that have a legal duty to provide secure environments for their students, faculty and visitors. As noted in a 2007 [report](http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/reports/no-gun-left-behind.pdf) by the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, there are four reasons why gun violence would be likely to increase if more guns were present on college campuses: (1) The prevalence of drugs and alcohol; (2) The risk of suicide and mental health issues; (3) The likelihood of gun thefts, and; (4) An increased risk of accidental shootings. A 2007 [study](http://www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/380-College%20II%20Final-Revised.pdf) by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University found that “nearly half of America’s 5.4 million full-time college students abuse drugs or drink alcohol on binges at least once a month.” Another [study](http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED371681) found that alcohol is involved in 95% of the violent crime on campus. The combination of alcohol, drugs and guns is a dangerous mix that could lead to additional, and more lethal, violence on campus. A 2002 [study](http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/firearms-research/surveillance-and-data-quality/) by the Harvard School of Public Health compared students who have a firearm at college with those who do not have a firearm. They found that students who have a firearm at college are more likely to binge drink, drive a motor vehicle after binge drinking, use illegal drugs, vandalize property, and get into trouble with the police. Suicide and mental health are also substantial issues on college campuses. One [study](http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/03/29/suicide) found that 24% of college students had thought about attempting suicide and 5% had actually attempted to kill themselves. Firearms, of course, make many types of violence more lethal. Suicide attempts are [successful more than 90% of the time when a firearm is used](http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/2007-releases/press04102007.html). By comparison, such attempts are fatal only 3% of the time when a drug overdose is the method used. One [study](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16789651) that examined college student suicide from 1920-2004 found that, “It is the reduced use of firearms as a method of suicide that is responsible for virtually all of the benefit associated with being a student … and that the relationship between student status and firearms may be the key to understanding why students commit suicide at a lower rate than does the general U.S. population.” Allowing concealed handguns on campus would also increase the risk of gun theft and accidental shootings. College dorm rooms are typically small, with few places available to lock up or secure a handgun. They also experience considerable numbers of visitors who could gain unauthorized access to these firearms.

#### Guns don't deter and they don’t reduce casualties – this metastudy is actually fire

**Webster et.al 16** [Daniel W. Webster, ScD, MPH John J. Donohue III, PhD, JD Louis Klarevas, PhD Cassandra K. Crifasi, PhD, MPH Jon S. Vernick, JD, MPH David Jernigan, PhD Holly C. Wilcox, PhD Sara B. Johnson, PhD, MPH Sheldon Greenberg, PhD Emma E. McGinty, PhD, M. “Firearms on College Campuses: Research Evidence and Policy Implications” October 15, 2016. Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research.] NB

John Lott, author of the book More Guns, Less Crime, popularized the notion that “gun free zones” invite mass shootings and contribute to the number of casualties from those events because there are no armed defenders to interrupt rampage shootings. Specifically, Lott purports that perpetrators of mass shootings intentionally seek out places where people are barred from carrying firearms in order to maximize casualties and minimize their risk of being shot. He claims that allowing civilians to legally carry loaded guns in public places increases the odds that an attempted rampage shooting will be interrupted and the number of casualties reduced; however, Lott’s claims are inconsistent with available evidence.17 The most prominent justification in support of campus-carry policies relates to the potential for armed civilians to intervene to reduce the carnage of active shootings. According to the advocates of allowing civilians to carry firearms on college campuses, some individuals considering perpetrating a mass shooting will be deterred from attacking places where they stand a likelihood of being confronted by private citizens carrying firearms. In instances when deterrence fails and attacks are initiated, campus-carry advocates claim that armed students and staff will be able to intervene and halt gun rampages and thereby minimize the number of victims killed or wounded in the attack.18 Below, we assess the evidence of the three underlying arguments for the campus-carry movement relevant to mass shootings. First, the occurrence and lethality of mass shootings is drastically reduced in so-called Right-to-Carry (RTC) jurisdictions.i Second, mass shootings occur almost exclusively in “gun-free zones,” where civilians are prohibited from carrying loaded firearms on their person. Third, when shooting rampages do occur, the active shooters are often stopped by armed civilians who confront the perpetrators. As campus-carry is a relatively new phenomenon, there is little evidence that confirms or refutes the thesis specifically in the context of college campuses. However, there are several studies that assess the three underlying propositions that form the foundation of the campus-carry thesis. Examining each tenet individually offers valuable insights. Right-to-Carry Firearm Laws Do Not Reduce Mass Shootings or Casualties from Such Shootings Advocates for allowing civilians to bring guns onto college campuses and to deregulate carrying of guns in public places in general commonly cite research and statements by John Lott, an economist widely known for his claims that deregulating gun possession reaps significant reductions in violent crime.17,19 Lott supports his claims with data and analytic methods that others have consistently found to have important flaws. In the 2nd edition of More Guns, Less Crime, Lott reported to have assembled a dataset of all mass shootings in the United States from 1977 to 1997. He found that the adoption of RTC laws was associated with a 67% reduction in mass shootings, completely eliminating mass shootings within five years of enactment. He also claimed RTC laws led to a 75% reduction in deaths from such shootings and an 81% reduction in persons injured in these shootings. However, an independent team of researchers tried to reproduce Lott’s findings on RTC laws and mass shootings, and found no association between such laws and such shootings.20 Lott’s claims pertaining to mass shootings and RTC laws are also inconsistent with evidence about mass shootings assembled in Louis Klarevas’s forthcoming book on the topic.21 Klarevas collected data on 111 high-fatality mass shootings (6 or more people murdered with a gun) from 1966 through 2015. He found that in the 41 states that currently have RTC laws or no regulation of concealed carrying of firearms for legal gun owners, the average death toll in high-fatality mass shootings increased following the implementation of a RTC law from a mean of 7.5 before to 8.4 after the law. Moreover, this pattern of over eight fatalities per incident, on average, held well after five years, contradicting Lott’s assertion that mass shootings stop occurring within five years of the enactment of RTC laws. When Klarevas expanded his data set to include all 50 states and the District of Columbia, the average death toll in gun massacres was slightly higher in states and years where RTC laws were in place (8.4) than in states and years where there were no RTC laws in place (8.0). There is No Evidence that “Gun-Free Zones” Facilitate Mass Shootings When John Lott’s book was reissued in its 3rd edition in 2010, he introduced a new concept that characterized places “where private citizens are not allowed to carry guns”: gun-free zones. He maintained that in locations where someone is bound to be armed, rampage gunmen will be thwarted. Further, he claimed that mass shooters—knowing they will face far less resistance in places where their potential victims are unarmed—consciously target gun-free zones. Unfortunately, the concept of a gun- free zone has never been properly defined. Initially, Lott described gun-free zones as locales “where private citizens are not allowed to carry guns.” Subsequently, Lott began embracing a looser conceptualization that deemed entire cities and counties to be gun-free zones, if they were extremely restrictive in issuing concealed-carry permits.22 Another problem with the term “gun-free zone” relates to how proponents of unrestricted gun carrying define areas as gun free when there are law enforcement officers and armed security guards on the premises, though civilians are prohibited from carrying their personal firearms on site. Lott characterized military installations like Fort Hood and the Washington Navy Yard, which have been attacked by rampage gunmen, as gun free despite the presence of significant armed security personnel. The implication of this notion of “gun free” is that rampage shooters are only deterred by armed civilians, not by armed guards and law enforcement. But a bullet fired from a police officer’s firearm has similar stopping power to a bullet from a civilian’s firearm, and it is probably more likely to hit its intended target since security and law enforcement personnel are likely to be better trained and prepared to respond to a rampage shooting than is the average civilian gun carrier. Sharpening definitions can alleviate the ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding gun-free zones and their relationship to mass shootings. In Klarevas’s study of rampage shootings, he argues that it makes more sense to distinguish between truly gun-free zones – places where there are never armed personnel stationed on the property and private citizens are prohibited from being armed with personal firearms by law or appropriate notice – and “gun-restricting zones” – places where private citizens are barred from carrying personal firearms by law or appropriate notice, yet armed security is routinely present. Most military bases and college campuses are gun restricting, as they typically have armed guards and/or armed police on regular patrol, but prohibit civilians from bearing arms. To round out the possibilities, Klarevas identified “gun-allowing zones” as places where private civilians are not legally prohibited from carrying personal firearms.21 A review conducted by Klarevas of the 111 high-fatality mass shootings (six or more victims murdered) that occurred in the U.S. since 1966 found that only eighteen have taken place, in whole or in part, in a gun-free zone or gun-restricting zone. (Three of these eighteen incidents occurred, in part, in gun-allowing zones.) Of these eighteen high-fatality mass shootings in gun-free or gun-restricting zones, thirteen took place in bona fide gun-free zones. The remaining five incidents occurred in gun-restricting zones. Contrary to what Lott argues, 84% of all gun massacres occurred in whole or in part where there is no evidence that civilian guns were prohibited, and nearly 90% occurred in whole or in part in locations where civilian guns were allowed or there was armed security or law enforcement. These 111 incidents did not include the mass shooting of police officers in Dallas on July 7 that obviously occurred in a gun-allowing zone where there were numerous Dallas police officers, campus police, and civilians openly carrying firearms. Among the wounded were two El Centro College police officers. These data do not suggest that gun-allowing zones deter gun massacres.ii There is also little evidence that perpetrators of mass shootings intentionally seek out their targets based on whether or not civilians are prohibited from having guns. Most targets of mass shootings are directed at a specific person, group, or institution with whom the perpetrator has a grievance.21 Everytown for Gun Safety analyzed data on mass shootings using a slightly less conservative definition than that employed by Klarevas – four persons killed with a firearm, not including the shooter – for the period 2009-2015 and found that the majority (57%) of the incidents involved a shooter’s current or former intimate partner or family member. Seventy-one percent of the incidents occurred in a private dwelling and only 13% occurred in a public location that could qualify as a gun free or gun restricting zone.23 Effective Neutralization of Active Shooters Requires Skills and Experience that Most Civilians Lack There is an unsupported assumption of campus carry advocates that armed students or staff on campus will shoot accurately enough to stop the shooter in an active shooting incident without wounding or killing innocent victims. Shooting accurately and making appropriate judgments about when and how to shoot in chaotic, high-stress situations requires a high level of familiarity with tactics and the ability to manage stress under intense pressure. Shooting accuracy in such situations is influenced by distance, the opponent shooter’s actions, lighting, use of cover, type of gun, and more.24 Ability to shoot accurately are also affected by heart rate, breathing, fatigue, and mental stress.25 Effective and responsible use of a firearm under the conditions of an active shooting requires significant training. Yet most RTC laws require only that carry permit holders have weapon familiarity, perform basic range shooting and, in some cases, minimal crisis-shooting training to qualify to legally carry a gun. Of course, there are no training or performance requirements in states that do not require civilians to obtain a permit to carry concealed firearms. There is well-documented research citing the inaccuracy of police officers who use firearms in crisis encounters, although they receive extensive training and readiness preparation. 26 There is no reason to believe that college students, faculty and civilian staff will shoot accurately in active shooter situations when they have only passed minimal training requirements for a permit to carry. Generally, college and university students function at a high rate of mental and emotional stress, with over 50% reporting that they feel so depressed that it is difficult for them to function.27 Legally Armed Citizens Very Rarely Successfully Intervene to Prevent or Interrupt Mass Shootings One rationale for allowing guns on campus is that by increasing the number of armed civilians, you increase the ability of someone to effectively intervene with a gun to stop someone engaging in or attempting a mass shooting. Opponents of gun-free zones do not just argue that civilians carrying firearms can prevent mass shootings from occurring in the first place. They also maintain that, should deterrence fail, armed people will help reduce the bloodshed by neutralizing perpetrators before they can complete their rampages. In theory, this too sounds logical. Again, Lott is the source of this thesis. In particular, his central contribution to this debate is his effort to assemble an anecdotal compilation of thirty-one shootings since 1990 that involved armed civilians intervening and halting rampage gunmen from completing their objective of killing as many people as possible. Others have seized on his initiative, and the list of incidents now numbers 39.19 But there is one substantial problem with this list. When Klarevas scrutinized the specific instances where armed civilians purportedly intervened to end a mass shooting in progress, he found that, in reality, rarely did private citizens with personal guns stop rampages. Of the 39 incidents, the majority—22 incidents—did not involve mass-shooting scenarios. Instead, they were knife attacks, gun- brandishing episodes where the weapon was never fired, armed robberies where the criminals never tried to execute the customers present, and shootings that did not involve enough targeted victims to constitute a mass shooting. Seventeen of the 39 were actual mass-shooting situations. Out of this subset, the armed intervenor in six of these incidents was a law enforcement officer or armed security guard (not a private citizen). In two cases, armed civilians drew their weapons and helped detain the perpetrators, but only after the shootings had concluded. (Neither defender in these two incidents actually used his weapon to end the rampage.) In five shootings, the attempted defensive gun uses failed to stop the attacks, with the armed intervenors shot in three of these instances.28, 18, 29 Over a 26- year period, only four incidents that were actual rampage shootings in progress were terminated by the actions of an armed civilian. An FBI study that examined 160 active shootings in the United States during 2000-2013 also provides reason to be suspect of claims that civilian defensive gun uses figure prominently in terminating ongoing gun rampages. FBI researchers found only one incident that involved an armed civilian intervening to end an attack in progress. The civilian in that incident (which is also one of the interventions cited by Klarevas) involved a U.S. Marine with a concealed-firearms license shooting a man attacking patrons in a Nevada bar. In another four incidents, the attacks were brought to an end when armed security guards shot the perpetrators. By contrast, the FBI found that 21 of the 160 active shooting incidents were interrupted when unarmed civilians confronted and restrained the gunmen. The FBI’s data suggest that unarmed civilians are more than twenty times likely to successfully end an active shooting than are armed civilians.30 Of course, some incidents could potentially have led to mass shootings had an armed civilian not intervened quickly to prevent more casualties. Klarevas’s review of civilian-interrupted mass shootings would miss some instances of this sort. However, allowing more civilians to carry firearms into more public places could also facilitate more mass shootings. The Violence Policy Center has tracked incidents in which a concealed carry weapon (CCW) permit holder was alleged to have committed various crimes of violence and unintentional shootings. They identified 29 CCW holders who perpetrated non-defensive shootings that involved three or more deaths not including the shooter during the period 2007-2015.31 Defensive and Hostile Gun Use by Civilians Debates surrounding policies about guns on college campuses hinge on differing views about civilian use of firearms including the likelihood that a person can successfully use a firearm to ward off a criminal assailant in comparison to the likelihood that a person carrying a gun might be prompted to use his or her gun in hostile or even criminal ways. Unfortunately, there are no surveillance systems designed to identify and verify acts of self-defense with guns. The best available data on the phenomena come from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) which interviews a nationally representative sample (after weighting) of approximately 90,000 households and over 158,000 individuals age 12 years and older. Households remain in the NCVS sample for three years and eligible individuals are interviewed every six months about their experiences in which they were a victim of crime, any actions that they took in response to the attempted or actual crime, and outcomes such as whether or not they were injured in the crime. Response rates for households and individuals within those households are typically around 85%, an exceptional rate for survey research. David Hemenway and Sara Solnick recently published a study based on data from the NCVS for the five-year period 2007-2011 to examine the use of guns by crime victims and estimate the effects of victims using a gun in response to a crime versus others actions commonly taken by crime victims.32 During the study period, there were 62 cases in which a NCVS respondent reported being a victim of a violent crimeiii and used a gun in self-defense and an additional 65 who used a gun in property crimes or situations involving only verbal threat to the victim. These 62 incidents represented 0.9% of all violent crimes reported (6,663) and accounted for 8.1 incidents per 100,000 population per year or a total of 102,478 self-defense gun uses (SDGUs) against violent crimes annually. In less than one fifth of the incidents of reported SDGU, the offender was also armed with a gun. Seventy-three percent of SDGUs reported by men and 48% of SDGUs reported by women occurred away from their homes. None of the SDGUs over the five-year period involved sexual assaults. Victim Gun Use in Response to Criminal Acts Do Not Affect Victims’ Risk of Injury In this study, Hemenway and Solnick also examined victims’ risk of being injured after taking any of thirteen specific actions volunteered by NCVS respondents when asked what they did or tried to do about the incident while it was going on. Four percent of those who reported a SDGU reported being injured after attempting to protect themselves with a gun; a virtually identical odds of injury among all victims who took any act of self-protection. After controlling for a host of contextual factors, self- defensive gun use did not significantly affect victims’ risk of being injured in the criminal act. Most victims who are injured in crimes are injured before they can take any protective action. Prior studies suggesting SDGU reduces victims’ injury risk used NCVS data that did not distinguish victim injuries that occurred before versus after protective actions such as SDGU took place and, thus, could not ascertain causal connections between SDGU and injury risks.33,34 The NCVS does not ask respondents whether they used a gun in a hostile or unlawful manner. Drawing upon NCVS victimization data for the five years studied by Hemenway and Solnick (2007-2011) and including firearm homicides for those years, there were 3.6 victimizations involving firearms for every self-reported SDGU in response to a violent crime.iv It is unknown what percentage of the criminal uses of guns nationally were committed by individuals who owned guns legally. However, data from a nationally representative survey of state prison inmates and determined that of those who were incarcerated for committing a violent crime with a firearm in the thirteen states with the lowest legal standards, 60 percent legally possessed the firearms when they committed the crime.35 The true incidence of SDGU may be significantly lower than indicated by the NCVS because the data are based on self-reports and determining who is the aggressor and who is the victim in interpersonal altercations can be highly subjective. Hemenway and colleagues fielded two surveys of a nationally representative sample of gun owners to ascertain gun owners’ reports of both defensive uses of guns and hostile uses of guns against respondents. Respondents were asked to describe these incidents in some detail and five criminal court judges were asked to review the narratives and assess the probably legality of self-reported use of guns.36 In the majority of the self-reported SDGUs, most criminal court judges considered the actions taken by the respondent with their guns to be “probably illegal” due to inadequate justification for using deadly force. The judges’ were told to assume that the respondent had a valid permit to own and carry the gun, and that the respondent had described the event honestly. An alternative source of data on SDGU to the NCVS is a national phone survey of 4,977 gun owners directed by criminologist Gary Kleck in the early 1990s. In this survey, 56 (1.1%) respondents reported having used defensively used a gun within the past 12 months in situations in which they report being the would-be victim of a crime. Kleck used these data to make a projection that 2.5 million times per year a U.S. citizen used a firearm defensively in situations when someone was committing or attempting to commit a crime – about 22 times higher than the estimate from the NCVS.37 The projections from Kleck’s survey are discordant with data from other sources relevant to crime and violence, calling into question the validity of the data. For example, Kleck’s survey data extrapolate to over 200,000 assailants shot by civilians defending themselves against crime each year. During the early 1990s when the survey was conducted there were approximately 300 deaths per year that were recorded as justifiable homicides committed by civilians using firearms.38 There is no direct measure of criminals suffering nonfatal wounds as a result of being shot by civilians defending themselves, but the CDC’s surveillance systems for tracking all deaths and a nationally representative sample of nonfatal injuries treated in hospitals indicates that there are roughly four to five persons suffering nonfatal gunshot wounds in assaults or incidents of undetermined intent for every fatal gunshot wound with the same external cause. That would suggest that about no more than 1,800 persons shot by civilians defending themselves against criminal attacks for the period that Kleck’s survey projects 200,000 – a wounding rate more than 100 times higher than indicated in hospital surveillance systems. The Impact of Laws Expanding Civilians Ability to Carry Firearms in Public Places In 2005 the National Research Council reviewed the then-current information with data through 2000 concerning the impact of state laws allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons.39 Noting that the estimated effects of so-called right to carry (RTC) laws were highly sensitive to the particular choice of explanatory variables, the report concluded that the evidence was too uncertain to determine the impact of RTC laws on crime. A major obstacle to generating a valid estimate of this impact was that most of the studies looking at this question included data for the period from 1985 through the early 1990s when violent crime rose sharply in certain areas, such as California, New York, and the District of Columbia, owing principally to the introduction of crack cocaine. Since all three of those jurisdictions and a number of other states with the worst crack problems (e.g., Maryland, New Jersey) also did not adopt RTC laws, any panel data analysis that did not control for the criminogenic influence of crack would necessarily generate a biased estimate of the impact of RTC laws that would make them appear to be either less harmful or more beneficial than they actually were in influencing crime. This was a major problem for the original study of RTC laws by John Lott and David Mustard and subsequent analyses by Lott.17,19,40 But this problem plagues every panel data analysis of RTC laws, except for those that started after the impact of crack had been full dissipated in the very late 1990s or early 2000s.v A quick but admittedly crude way to address this problem is to present a difference-in- differences comparison between the 36 states that adopted RTC laws over the period 1977-2012 and the ten states that did not adopt these laws. By comparing the change in crime from a period before crack emerged to a year well after its impact had dissipated, one can eliminate the impact of crack on crime (although of course this simple comparison does not control for other influences on crime that differed over this period for the two sets of states). Figure 1 shows that the ten non-RTC states enjoyed a 38.1% drop in their violent crime rate from 1977 to 2012, while the 36 adopting states had almost no change in violent crime over this period (a decline of 2% over a 35-year period). This simple evidence is suggestive that RTC laws tend to exacerbate violent crime (controlling for the influence of crack but not for other explanatory variables). Obviously, this chart would overstate the harm of RTC laws if, say, the non-adopting states had increased their per capita rates of incarceration or police personnel more than the adopting states, thereby suppressing violent crime through those mechanisms (which could then potentially explain the relatively better experience with violent crime over the 1977-2012 period in the non-adopting states). In fact, the opposite is true. The adopting states had considerably larger percentage increases relative to the non-adopting states over this time period in their rates of incarceration (262% vs. 221%) and police staffing (61% vs. 26%). The relatively better crime performance of non-RTC-adopting states in the raw comparison of in the figure below could be even greater if one were to control for the influence on violent crime of police and incarceration. Of course, many factors in addition to police, incarceration, and crack influence crime and the challenge for researchers who seek to find the impact of a single factor such as RTC laws is to account for those factors that may also be correlated with RTC adoption in an appropriately specified statistical model. A number of panel data analyses conducted since the publication of the NRC report have tried to control for a host of explanatory variables. These models, however, have not adequately controlled for the criminogenic influence of crack (thereby making RTC laws look better) as well as other factors that are likely to bias the estimated effects of RTC laws. The Most Recent Rigorous Research Studies Find RTC Laws Linked to Increased Violence Donohue, Aneja, and Webber attempted to address these deficiencies with state panel data analyses that extended the NRC data by twelve years, during which time eleven additional states adopted RTC laws, to 1979-2012. Two models were used to explore the relationship between RTC laws and crime. Model 1 estimated shifts in the level of crime after RTC adoption and model 2 estimated RTC laws’ association with changes in crime trends or slopes. Both models indicated that violent and property crime both increased in response to the adoption of RTC laws. Specifically, violent crime was 12.3% higher after adoption of RTC laws and violent crime increases about 1.1% more for each year RTC laws are in effect. New and sophisticated techniques are being employed to assist researchers in finding the best set of control states that have violent crime patterns most similar to the states adopting new laws. Research by Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers attempts to sort out the different specification choices between Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang, and Lott and Mustard, using a Bayesian model averaging approach.41 Applying this technique to analyze the impact of RTC laws using county data from 1979- 2000, the authors find that in their preferred spline (trend) model, RTC laws elevate violent crime rates by 6.5% in the three years after RTC adoption, with the effects growing over time. A recent report from the Brennan Center based on state-level data for 1979-2012 indicates that violent crime increased, on average, 10% following RTC law adoption. 42 Zimmerman (2015) examined the impact of various crime prevention measures on crime using a state panel data set from 1999-2010. The findings from this study revealed statistically significant increases in murder, robbery and assault associated with RTC law adoption. Estimating so-called synthetic controls for states that adopt new policies is a relatively new technique to evaluate the impact of state policy changes on violent crime and other outcomes. This approach addresses some of the challenges posed by regression analyses with panel data from 50 very disparate states. Webber, Donohue, and Aneja used this approach and found evidence that RTC laws increase violent crime by 12% to 18% over the ten years after adoption. These results are broadly consistent with the bulk of the panel data estimates cited above and are inconsistent with the outlier results generated using the Lott’s model specifications. One difference between the two analytic approaches is that the panel data estimates typically found that RTC laws were associated with increases in both violent and property crime, while the synthetic controls estimates only found evidence that RTC laws increase violent crime. Some final comments should be made about the likely mechanisms between adoption of RTC laws and increased crime, which the statistical studies do not directly address. First, the supporters of RTC laws frequently cite evidence that permit holders, as a group, are arrested for violent crimes at relatively low rates. 43 But the important policy question is whether having a CCW (and carrying a gun on one’s person or in one’s vehicle) affects CCW holders’ risk of committing acts of violence and whether having more people carrying firearms will increase or decrease the incidents of violent crime and the lethality of those incidents. Ready access to a loaded firearm is likely to have a greater impact on risk of committing serious acts of violence among individuals with a history of violence, recklessness, substance abuse, or those prone to impulsivity or angry outbursts. Passing a background check when the principal criteria for denial are a convictions for either a felony crime or misdemeanor domestic battery, having a current domestic violence restraining order, or having been adjudicated mentally incompetent or a serious threat to self or others due to mental illness is no guarantee that a person is not prone to violence and can be trusted to carry a loaded concealed firearm in public places.44,35 CCW holders do commit serious crimes with guns including murder and mass shootings.31 Second, RTC laws can increase crime in many ways even if the permit holders are not committing it. The ability to carry a gun may embolden some permit holders to incite criminal responses to their provocative behavior, as some have alleged in the George Zimmerman case leading to the death of Trayvon Martin. Criminals may also be more likely to carry weapons in response to RTC adoption and more likely to be aggressive towards their victims if they fear armed opposition. Guns carried outside the home because of RTC laws are potentially more likely to be lost or stolen, especially when left in motor vehicles, which can expand criminals’ access to guns. Finally, the presence of more guns can complicate the job of police and simply take up more police time as they process applications and check for permit validity when they confront armed citizens. The recent July 2016 shooting by police of concealed carry permit holder Philando Castile in Minnesota underscores how the introduction of a gun by a law-abiding citizen can end in tragedy. Why the College Campus Environment is Ill-Suited for the Civilian Gun Possession The broader research literature on civilian gun use and policies that allow civilians to carry concealed firearms has not examined the experience or implications of policies that allow students, staff, faculty, or visitors to carry firearms onto college campuses. Relevant to this discussion is the frequency and nature of events where civilians might use firearms at their disposal, the capacity and proclivities of adolescents and young adults of typical college age to make prudent decisions about when or how to use firearms, the onset of severe mental illness during young adulthood, the frequency of binge drinking of alcoholic beverages among college students and the violence that stems from that drinking. In addition, suicidal ideation and behavior is common during late adolescence and early adulthood and increasing access to firearms through policies that allow guns onto college campuses could increase risk of suicide among college students. Due to a variety of developmental, psychological, and sociological reasons, age-specific homicide offending rates increase dramatically during adolescence, peaking at age nineteen, and are highest during the age span of most college students (18- 24 years). Suicide attempts that lead to hospital treatment or death also rise dramatically and peak during the years that most youth enter college. A recent study identified 85 incidents of shootings or undesirable discharges of firearms on college campuses in the U.S. from January 2013 through June 2016. Only two of these 85 incidents (2.4%) involved a shooter on a rampage. The most common incidents were interpersonal disputes that escalated into gun violence (45%), premeditated acts of violence against an individual (12%), suicides or murder/suicides (12%), and unintentional shootings or discharges (9%).45

#### Prefer

#### A. directly comparative with the aff studies and explains their deficitis

#### B. scope of study—40 years – that factors out temporal extraneous variables

#### C. controls for various factors that they don’t and matches it correctly to college students

#### D. uses a various amount of studies which aggregates data from different nonprofit sources

#### Guns increase risk of police militarization

**Debrabander 15** [Firmin DeBrabander 15 [associate professor of philosophy at Maryland Institute College of Art, has written social and political commentary for numerous publications, including the Baltimore Sun, Common Dreams, Counterpunch, and the New York Times] “Do Guns Make Us Free?: Democracy and the Armed Society”, Yale University Press, 19 May 2015, BE

This leads to another reason guns are inimical to protest: they might incite police to react roughly, as has happened many times in the past, even when rallies were nominally or largely peaceful. What if the protesters had been armed at the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968— where police, goaded by the defiant mayor, were already itching for a confrontation— or in Seattle in 2000, when police battled anarchists smashing store windows? What if the Occupy Wall Street protesters had stashed guns in their tents before the New York City Police Department descended on Zuccotti Park to disband their encampment? We cannot imagine guns in each of these cases because the police never would have allowed such protests in the first place. Police typically justify rough treatment of protesters by saying the latter had become unruly, violent, abusive, and posed a threat to the larger community. In many cities in 2011, police departments broke up Occupy camps on the grounds that they were becoming dangerous. Guns in the hands of protesters only strengthen the police’s case for subduing protest. Further, consider the prospect of armed protesters in the face of our increasingly militarized police. Many observers of the Occupy movement commented on the militaristic approach taken by police, especially in disbanding the protests. A New York Times article entitled “When the Police Go Military” offered a summation: “Riot police officers tear-gassing protesters at the Occupy movement in Oakland, Calif. The surprising nighttime invasion of Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan, carried out with D-Day like secrecy by officers deploying klieg lights and a military-style sound machine. And campus police officers in helmets and face shields dousing demonstrators at the University of California Davis with pepper spray.” 89 The article went on to say that such actions stem from years of police department build-up during the War on Terror. Facing the possibility of a domestic terror attack and showered with money from the Department of Homeland Security, police departments across the country have bulked up on military gear— even in small towns— and shown greater readiness to employ SWAT teams for all manner of incidents, including nonviolent protests. 90 In his book The Democracy Project, activist David Graeber writes of the anomalous presence of a SWAT team at a small Occupy protest soon after the Zuccotti Park sweep. Cato Institute fellow Timothy Lynch complains of an increasingly “militaristic mind-set” among police, apparent in “the way they search and raid homes and the way they deal with the public.” 91¶ Lynch goes on to explain that “the more police fail to defuse confrontations but instead help create them— be it with their equipment, tactics or demeanor— the more ties with community members are burned. … The effect is a loss of civility, and an erosion of constitutional rights, rather than a building of good will.” 92 The journalist Radley Balko quotes a New Hampshire resident critical of his town’s plan to purchase a BearCat (a kind of armored vehicle) for its police department: “It promotes violence. … We should promote more human interaction rather than militarize.” 93 A militarized police, according to Lynch, endangers civility on both sides. Sending a SWAT team to a nonviolent, gun-free protest is an uncivil gesture by the police; it is an expression of deep suspicion. At the very least, it is a demonstrative threat to the protesters not to get out of hand— or, as Graeber argues, if the protesters are obviously peaceful, a SWAT team is a heavy-handed attempt to threaten them into protesting less vocally— or just less. Further, as Lynch suggests, militarized police are more likely to create than defuse confrontation. It is difficult to imagine how armed protesters, in the face of a SWAT team, could make the situation better for the protesters and uphold their right to speech. An armed protest facing a SWAT team is a combustible mixture; the presence of guns provides a perfect excuse for the police to crack down. Police were happy to disperse Occupy camps on far lesser grounds, including supposed public health threats. Imagine what they would do in the face of AR-15s. Even if they did not physically confront armed protesters, what would protest look like under those circumstances? I can’t imagine that it would be anything we could describe as free. To the contrary, it would be unbearably tense, electric, and ultimately muted as a result of the weaponry. But of course, police would outlaw protest in the first place, if protesters were armed. We can only exercise the right of assembly if assembly is nonviolent. When guns are present, especially among protesters, both assembly and free speech quickly vanish.

#### Reject their SCS evidence

#### A. It’s “Students for Concealed Carry” which proves selective biased readings of data that doesn’t qualify their argument compared our data

#### B. It evaluates about three states whereas our evidence evaluates the entire nation

#### C. Their evidence is purely correlative rather than causal- whereas ours does both and explains increased risks for college students

#### D. Experts- ours comes from reputable authors who are all professionals in their area of research compared to undergraduate students who just draw on random empirics